Albanese’s government might not thrill, but it has shown unity and competence – and that’s no mean feat

The campaign more generally was nothing to write home about. From the preoccupations of the major players, if you didn’t already know, you’d hardly have guessed that the wider world was in the midst of its greatest convulsions since the second world war, as the United States retreated from its longstanding global role into protectionism and isolationism, abandoning and bullying old friends and allies, helping rivals and enemies, upending international trade, and dismantling democracy and the rule of law.

The government assured voters it had everything in hand, adopting a small-target re-election strategy, to pair with its similar 2022 approach. Albanese invariably looked solid and prime ministerial. There was no fumbling the figures on the level of unemployment or the Reserve Bank cash rate this time.

Like the Coalition, Labor threw itself enthusiastically into a spendathon. It did not take major policy reform into the campaign. We live in the shadow of the two elections that saw parties with policy ambition suffer humiliating defeat: the Coalition in 1993 and Labor in 2019. That made the Coalition’s policy of building nuclear power plants foolhardy rather than brave.

Trump’s shadow followed Peter Dutton everywhere, making a small-target strategy unviable for the Coalition. On Trump, Dutton sometimes sounded a bit like Saint Peter thrice denying he knew Jesus Christ, but he reverted to type as the campaign wore on by playing up favoured culture war topics of the moment, such as winding back Indigenous Welcomes to Country.

But the Liberals’ biggest mistake – the one on which all others would be built – occurred three years ago, on May 30 2022.

Dutton, unopposed as the Liberal Party’s new leader, told his first press conference that his policies would be aimed at the “forgotten people” of the suburbs. It was a pitch so hackneyed as to be barely worth attention. But it was also a strange thing to say given the reality of the situation his party then faced – and still faces today.

Hackneyed, because Dutton’s promise recalled the Liberal Party’s talismanic foundational document, Robert Menzies’ “The Forgotten People”, broadcast 80 years before to the very month. But strange because the Coalition had been in office for nine years. If there were indeed “forgotten people” in the nation’s suburbs, the Coalition had surely enjoyed ample opportunity to remember them.

It was strange for another reason, too: the Liberal Party had just been devastated by the loss of its traditional urban heartland, Menzies’ old seat of Kooyong among the casualties. The residents of these electorates – most of them not far from city centres – may well have felt “forgotten”, but not in the sense Dutton imagined. They felt their values and interests were not reflected in the modern Liberal Party.

It is worth revisiting what Dutton said on that occasion, because it seems to have guided his whole pitch as opposition leader ever since:

I’m not giving up on any seat, but I do want to send a very clear message to those in the suburbs, particularly those in seats where there has been a swing against the Labor Party on their primary vote, in many parts of the country.

The emphasis here was not really on winning back teal seats. They received just a grudging nod of acknowledgement. For Dutton, it was all about going out into the suburbs and winning seats held by Labor. And true to form, teal seats received very little of his campaign attention during the 2025 campaign.

This was a foolish strategy of avoidance for which Dutton and the Liberal Party have now paid a heavy price. The Coalition’s journey took it into support for nuclear power, blaming housing shortages on immigration, and opposing a First Nations Voice to Parliament – the latter an issue the Coalition even desperately sought to revive against Labor during the campaign.

The Voice referendum nurtured the illusion that the six in ten “no” voters were ripe for Coalition picking. Wiser heads might have noticed Labor continued to rule for eight years after the Hawke government was humiliated at a 1988 referendum, and Menzies was prime minister for 15 years following his Communist Party referendum defeat^[1].

Wiser heads might also have noticed that the Coalition’s only path back to power demanded it address its losses in the more affluent metropolitan seats won by Independents, Labor and the Greens. Short of huge and unlikely advances in the outer suburbs and regional cities and towns, the Liberals need to win metropolitan seats with high proportions of well-off, well-educated, socially progressive and younger voters to be competitive for majority government.

Still, that was a hard ask in three years. It nonetheless left a chance of minority Coalition government, which many pundits believed a distinct possibility for much of 2024 and early 2025.

But where were the Coalition’s votes on the floor of the House going to come from, if not from teal and teal-like independents? The Greens? Hardly. It would have made a great deal of sense to pitch policies that might help to win over community independents and their supporters.

Instead, the Coalition alienated them, such as by joining with Labor to produce an ineffectual National Anti-Corruption Commission and new electoral finance laws opposed by the teals.

The Liberals and Nationals made little effort to attract women voters – indeed, policies such as opposing working from home alienated them – and they wandered off on their nuclear frolic. Dutton flirted with Trumpish policies on reducing immigration and public service cuts, before retreating on the latter but in such a confused manner as to leave voters without a clue what his intentions actually were.

Read more: When 'equal' does not mean 'the same': Liberals still do not understand their women problem^[2]

And as the Liberals’ election campaign unravelled, its friends in the right-wing media continued to campaign relentlessly against the teals. There was no method to this madness, unless it was shoring up the Coalition against possible depredations on its dwindling voting base from parties further to the right.

It is not that Labor was invincible. Its majority was the narrowest of any first-term government since 1913. It was under pressure in normally friendly Victoria. It lost momentum through the Voice referendum. Interest rates intensified mortgage stress. People complained they could afford a visit to neither the supermarket nor the doctor’s surgery. There was growing unease about immigration levels, and continuing frustration at the lack of housing.

The contest for government, however, is still largely a two-horse race and each of the major party leaders is the main bearer of their side’s colours. Dutton and the Liberals failed to do the hard yakka on policy, ideology, image or strategy.

Dutton himself continued to worry many voters as a risky proposition or worse. The few weeks of the election campaign itself seemed more consequential than most in living memory because it so amply demonstrated his lack of fitness for prime ministerial leadership.

For Labor, the Rudd and Gillard years remain the central reference in modern political history, formative of their understanding of what not to do in government if you want to be treated respectfully by voters.

In contrast, in the past three years, Labor established an image of unity and competence. We should not underestimate this achievement. It amounted to a significant rebuilding of the Labor brand.

“You campaign in poetry, you govern in prose,” New York governor Mario Cuomo was fond of saying. Labor has defied him: it campaigns and governs in prose.

But perhaps that’s what those fabled punters want: not a Trump-inspired disruptor, nor a radical visionary, but the kind of bloke you’d trust with your tax return.

The times ahead will call for more.

References

1. ^{^} Communist Party referendum defeat (www.moadoph.gov.au)
2. ^{^} When 'equal' does not mean 'the same': Liberals still do not understand their women problem (theconversation.com)