For decades the Strait of Hormuz has been one of the most important pieces of economic geography on Earth.

A narrow stretch of water between Iran and Oman became the gateway through which an extraordinary proportion of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas travelled.

The arrangement worked because, most of the time, the ships kept moving.

The Iran conflict has demonstrated what happens when they do not.

And an important consequence is now emerging.

The oil-producing nations of the Middle East are increasingly looking for ways to make themselves less dependent upon Hormuz.

Saudi Arabia is particularly important to that story.

Saudi Arabia already has an escape route

Saudi Arabia possesses something many of its neighbours would dearly like to have: an established pipeline capable of carrying enormous quantities of oil from the country's eastern producing regions across the Arabian Peninsula to the Red Sea.

The East–West Pipeline, commonly known as Petroline, terminates at Yanbu.

Oil exported from there does not have to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

That infrastructure has suddenly become much more strategically valuable.

Saudi Arabia is now reportedly considering increasing its capacity by another one to two million barrels a day.

Such an expansion would require substantial investment and would take years rather than months.

But the significance lies in why it is being contemplated.

Hormuz is no longer simply being treated as a theoretical geopolitical risk.

The risk has materialised.

Shipping through Hormuz has collapsed

Recent tanker attacks have again demonstrated the vulnerability of shipping through the strait.

Vessel movements have fallen to a fraction of their pre-war levels.

Before the conflict, more than 130 vessels could move through Hormuz in a typical day.

Recent shipping data has shown traffic falling dramatically below that level.

That matters far beyond the Middle East.

When tankers cannot move safely, the consequences eventually reach motorists, airlines, manufacturers, farmers, freight companies and consumers thousands of kilometres away.

Australia may be geographically distant from Hormuz.

Economically, it is not.

Saudi Arabia is not alone

Other Gulf producers have reached much the same conclusion.

The United Arab Emirates already has pipeline infrastructure connecting Abu Dhabi's oil-producing areas with Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman — outside the Strait of Hormuz — and further capacity is being developed.

Kuwait has discussed possible pipeline arrangements with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other neighbouring countries.

Iraq is considering something considerably more ambitious: a new pipeline through Syria towards the Mediterranean.

That proposal would be enormously expensive and could take years to construct.

Nevertheless, the direction is becoming apparent.

The Middle East is beginning to contemplate an energy-export system in which Hormuz remains important but is no longer indispensable.

Geography has become infrastructure

There is a larger lesson here.

Oil production alone does not provide energy security.

The oil must be transported.

For decades the enormous petroleum reserves surrounding the Persian Gulf made economic sense precisely because tankers could collect the product and sail through Hormuz towards Asia, Europe and elsewhere.

But a production field without a reliable export route can quickly become a stranded asset.

Saudi Arabia's East–West Pipeline therefore represents much more than steel pipe buried across a desert.

It provides strategic optionality.

Oil can move west when the eastern maritime route becomes dangerous.

That capability has acquired extraordinary value during the present conflict.

The Red Sea becomes more important

There is, however, another complication.

Moving oil towards the Red Sea does not eliminate geopolitical risk.

Tankers leaving Yanbu still have to navigate international shipping routes, and vessels travelling south eventually approach the Bab el-Mandeb — another narrow and politically unstable maritime chokepoint.

Recent Houthi activity has demonstrated that the Red Sea route carries risks of its own.

The world therefore cannot simply replace one vulnerable strait with another and declare the problem solved.

What pipelines provide is diversification.

If several routes exist, disruption of one does not necessarily stop the entire system.

That principle is familiar in almost every industry.

Energy is no different.

Why Australia should pay attention

Australia is a substantial energy producer, but it remains dependent upon imported refined petroleum products.

Petrol, diesel and aviation fuel are integral to an economy spread across an enormous continent.

Transport companies need diesel.

Farmers need diesel.

Mining companies need fuel.

Airlines need aviation fuel.

Businesses need goods delivered.

Families need cars.

When international petroleum supply becomes more expensive or uncertain, those costs eventually work their way through the Australian economy.

That is why a pipeline being considered thousands of kilometres away in Saudi Arabia can ultimately matter at an Australian service station.

It is also why the restructuring of Middle Eastern energy infrastructure deserves attention here.

Hormuz will remain important

None of this means the Strait of Hormuz is about to become irrelevant.

Its geography is too important and the quantities of energy produced around the Persian Gulf are too large.

Building enough alternative infrastructure to replace it entirely would require extraordinary expenditure.

Some countries also have far greater ability to bypass the strait than others.

Saudi Arabia is particularly well positioned because of its geography: it possesses coastlines on both the Persian Gulf and Red Sea.

Many producers do not enjoy that advantage.

Hormuz will therefore remain one of the world's most important maritime passages.

But its monopoly over Gulf energy exports can be weakened.

That process appears to be accelerating.

Wars change infrastructure

There is historical symmetry in what is happening.

Saudi Arabia's East–West Pipeline was itself developed against the background of instability during the Iran-Iraq War and the tanker conflict of the 1980s.

Decades later, another confrontation involving Iran has demonstrated why that investment mattered.

Infrastructure built for yesterday's geopolitical problem has become part of the answer to today's.

The current crisis may now produce another generation of pipelines, terminals, storage facilities and alternative export routes.

Those projects could remain in operation long after the fighting has ended.

The Times View

The most important consequence of the Hormuz crisis may ultimately be something that happens quietly beneath the desert.

Pipelines do not attract the attention generated by missiles, warships or political declarations.

But they can permanently alter economic power.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Iraq have all been given an expensive reminder of the danger of relying upon a single maritime gateway.

The logical response is diversification.

If billions of dollars are subsequently invested in alternative pipelines and export terminals, the Strait of Hormuz will remain strategically important — but closing it will become progressively less powerful as an economic weapon.

For Australia, that would be significant.

The immediate story is about disrupted oil supplies and higher geopolitical risk.

The longer story may be about the construction of an energy system designed to ensure that the world never again depends quite so heavily on one narrow stretch of water.