President Trump has achieved action on Fentanyl precursor control by China

Donald Trump (as U.S. President) has achieved a major agreement with the People’s Republic of China concerning Fentanyl and its precursors/production

Background: The fentanyl-challenge and U.S.–China context

Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid many times more potent than heroin or morphine, and during the U.S. opioid-epidemic it became a leading cause of overdose deaths among young adults.

A key supply chain factor has been the production (or precursor supply) of fentanyl or fentanyl analogues in China (or via Chinese-origin chemicals), and the trafficking of those substances (or final product) into the U.S. (directly via mail or courier, or indirectly via Mexico/Canada).

Because of that, the U.S.–China bilateral relationship has come to include the fentanyl-issue: Washington has repeatedly pressed Beijing to control production/export of fentanyl and its precursor chemicals, and to cooperate in investigations.

In particular:

• In May 2019, China announced that it would place all fentanyl-related substances (including analogues) under national control (on its “Supplementary List of Controlled Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances”).

• That action apparently led to a marked drop in direct fentanyl shipments from China to the U.S. via mail/parcels.

• Even so, the challenge evolved: traffickers shifted from direct Chinese shipments of finished fentanyl to shipping precursor chemicals from China (or via third countries) and finishing the product in Mexico or elsewhere. USCC+1

Given this dynamic, the U.S. under Trump pressed both trade and narcotics policy levers (tariffs, export‐controls, designations) against China to force more action on fentanyl/precursor supply. For example, on 1 Feb 2025, Trump issued a presidential action titled “Imposing Duties to Address the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China”.

So by 2025 the stage was set for a renegotiated or reinforced agreement between Trump and China, linking trade/tariffs and counternarcotics cooperation.

What was the agreement achieved

In October 2025 (at the APEC Summit in Busan, South Korea) President Trump met with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and the two sides announced various elements of a deal covering tariffs, export controls, agriculture and – relevant here – the fentanyl/precursor chemical channel.

The following are the key terms (as publicly reported) pertaining to the fentanyl side of the deal:

1. Tariff reduction by the U.S.

   • The U.S. agreed to halve a specific 20 % tariff it had imposed on Chinese goods related to fentanyl-precursor chemicals. That duty was cut to 10 %.

   • As a result, the overall average tariff on Chinese goods (in the U.S.) was reduced somewhat (from ~57 % to ~47 % in some calculations).

2. Chinese commitments on precursor/production/export control

   • China agreed to take “unspecified measures” (in U.S. reporting) to tighten control over the production and export of fentanyl-precursor chemicals.

   • In the November 2025 follow-up, China announced export restrictions on 13 chemicals used in fentanyl production to the U.S., Canada and Mexico.

3. Broader package context

   • The fentanyl-component was part of a broader trade/industrial deal: China agreed to pause certain rare-earth export controls, increase U.S. agricultural purchases (soybeans, etc.) and suspend retaliatory tariffs. In exchange the U.S. made reciprocal concessions.

   • The deal was framed as a one-year “truce” in trade hostilities, rather than a comprehensive long-term treaty.

4. Enforcement and signalling

   • The U.S. emphasised that the fentanyl-component of the deal was about stopping the flow of illicit precursors into the U.S. and empowering law-enforcement cooperation.

   • China’s announcement of the 13 chemical controls was taken as a first tangible step in implementing that promise.

In sum: The agreement essentially blended a trade concession (tariff cut) from the U.S. with a chemical-export/control concession from China targeted at the fentanyl supply chain.

What specifically did China agree to regarding fentanyl production/supply?

Based on publicly available sources, here are the specific actions China has committed or begun to implement:

• China scheduled all fentanyl-related substances in May 2019 (prior to this 2025 deal), placing them on its Supplementary List of Controlled Narcotics.

• In the 2025 deal, China agreed to tighten control over the export of chemicals used as fentanyl precursors, especially shipments to the U.S., Canada, Mexico. For example: 13 “drug-making” chemicals were added to an export-control list on November 10 2025.

• China appears to have committed to stronger enforcement, compliance, border/customs controls of outbound chemical flows; China’s narcotics control authority issued warnings to enterprises about compliance.

However, there are limitations to what is publicly confirmed:

• The phrasing of China’s pledge is fairly vague (in many sources) — e.g., “unspecified measures”, “tightened control”, rather than a fully defined timetable and list of chemicals in the publicly released text.

• Much of the fentanyl supply chain now is via precursor chemicals (rather than finished product) and via third countries (e.g., Mexico). So the effective scope of China’s control must cover not just Chinese exports directly to the U.S., but trans-shipment or export to other jurisdictions.

Why this deal matters

From the U.S. perspective, why is this agreement (or claimed agreement) significant?

• With fentanyl overdose deaths being a major public health and social crisis in the U.S., controlling supply-side inputs (such as precursors) is a key strategic element. The deal signals that the U.S. is using trade diplomacy (tariffs) to try influence chemical-manufacturing export regimes.

• The tariff cut from 20 % to 10 % functions as a lever: the U.S. is offering a concession in return for China’s compliance on the fentanyl-precursor front. Economists note that such a move may modestly benefit the U.S. economy (via lower tariffs) while supporting public-health goals.

• For China, the deal offers diplomatic relief (trade hostilities paused) and a chance to demonstrate cooperation. Controlling precursor exports can help China’s international image.

• Bilaterally, the deal ties industrial/trade issues with narcotics/counternarcotics issues, reflecting the intertwining of supply-chain, national security, manufacturing, chemical regulation and law enforcement.

Key caveats and open questions

While the agreement is notable, it also comes with several caveats and unanswered issues:

1. Implementation and verification

   • Ultimately, the effectiveness depends on enforcement: how vigorously China will monitor, investigate, sanction firms within its chemical and pharmaceutical sectors that divert chemicals to illicit use. Historically China’s regulation of its vast chemical-industry base has been inconsistent.

   • Also, shipping across third-country jurisdictions may complicate enforcement: even if China restricts direct shipments to the U.S., traffickers may route via other countries or divert export licences, etc.

2. Scope of chemicals and supply-chain

   • The public announcements list 13 chemicals newly controlled in November 2025, but not (in those announcements) the full set of all known precursor chemicals used in fentanyl production. The universe of chemical precursors is large and evolving (traffickers innovate).

   • The deal appears to emphasise precursors more than finished fentanyl, and may not fully address other supply-chain nodes such as manufacturing equipment, pill-press exports, money-laundering networks.

3. Durability of the deal

   • The deal is described as a one-year truce (or pause) rather than a long-term treaty with binding mechanisms.

   • The broader U.S.–China strategic rivalry (technology, rare earths, Taiwan, human rights) remains unresolved; thus the fentanyl component may be vulnerable to broader trade/geo-political fallout.

4. Public health impact is uncertain

   • While some economists estimate positive outcomes (both economic and health) from the deal, they caution that the benefits are modest and uncertain. For example, tighter controls could reduce overdose deaths, but only if supply-chain disruptions translate into lower availability/purity in the U.S. market.

   • Moreover, demand-side problems in the U.S. (addiction, treatment, recovery infrastructure) remain critical and are outside the scope of this deal.

5. Past cooperation was uneven

   • It’s worth noting that although China scheduled all fentanyl analogues in 2019, bilateral counternarcotics cooperation later stalled (especially from 2020 onward) due to wider U.S.–China tensions.

   • This raises questions about whether the 2025 deal represents a strong commitment or a tactical pause.

Implications for the U.S., China & global community

For the U.S.:

• This kind of deal signals a shift in how the U.S. frames the opioid crisis: not just as domestic public-health, but as linked to global supply chains, trade and national security.

• If implemented well, it may reduce the flow of illicit fentanyl/precursors and help reduce overdose deaths (though as above, the effect may be modest).

• It may provide trade benefits (lower tariffs) for U.S. manufacturers/importers of Chinese goods.

For China:

• It gives Beijing an opportunity to demonstrate global leadership/cooperation on a high-profile issue (fentanyl) and thereby improve its international reputation.

• At the same time, control of its chemical sector implicates significant regulatory burdens on many firms — which may create internal resistance or enforcement challenges.

• The deal may be part of China’s broader strategy to reduce trade tensions and avoid further escalation with the U.S.

For global drug control:

• Precursor-chemical control is increasingly recognised as a vital piece of the synthetic-opioid supply-chain puzzle. China’s commitments may create positive ripple effects (other chemical-exporting jurisdictions may follow).

• However, as supply chains evolve, traffickers may shift to other countries (India, Southeast Asia) or other routes – meaning continuous adaptation is necessary.

Conclusion

In summary, President Trump’s agreement with China over fentanyl production/supply created a linkage between trade concessions (tariff reduction) and chemical-export controls (China tightening precursor exports). On paper, China’s commitment to restrict the export of certain precursor chemicals and the U.S.’s willingness to reduce tariffs represent a tangible step forward.

However, while the deal marks progress, its ultimate value lies in the follow-through: how rigorously China enforces export-controls, how effectively the U.S. monitors the result (i.e., reduced precursor shipments, fewer trafficking routes), and whether supply disruptions translate into fewer overdose deaths in the U.S. Given the complexity of global illicit chemical supply chains and the myriad enforcement challenges, the pact is best seen as a positive incremental step, not a silver-bullet solution.

For you (in Australia) and globally, this interplay between trade, chemicals regulation and drug-trafficking underscores how consumer goods, manufacturing supply chains, international diplomacy and public-health outcomes are interconnected.

If you like, I can produce a timeline of U.S.–China fentanyl-related agreements (2017–2025) or a detailed breakdown of the specific precursor chemicals China has committed to controlling. Would you like me to pull that together?

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